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I argue that our direct experience and some physical facts do not go well with an understanding of
perception as a mechanism producing a representation of a “truly” outer world. Instead, it is much
more coherent to treat what is traditionally considered an image in this context as a closed structure
equipped in its own ontology, replacing the “truly” outer one from the point of view of an agent
possessing it. In such a framework, the notion of existence is taken to be defined by consciousness
in a way similar to qualia, making it subjective on the one hand, and reducing it to a tool on the
other. This implies, in turn, that we need a form of mind-brain dualism; the best we can do in such
circumstances about explaining consciousness as an epistemic device - a role intuitively imposing
itself in a variety of situations - is to embed it in an abstract ontology merely serving the purpose of
a “true” reality with the help of the mind-brain link. Obviously, the approach favors subjectivity as
a foundation in the ontological sense. Objectivity is considered here only as a suitably understood
product from an “observer’s” point of view, although a functional and useful one.
The paper is addressed to readers with interest in both the mind-body problem and ontologi-
cal foundations of present-day physics, specifically quantum theory. The main conclusion can be
absorbed without the quantum part, although it is a bit less convincing then.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is about a common-sense modification of
the common-sense notion of perception, introduced pri-
marily in order to build a basis for a reconciliation of
the subjective aspect of the mind and neuroscience. The
conceptual load of this redefinition is quite heavy, but
its consequences seem to be worth the price. Against a
naively conceived scientific attitude, I accept here that
the subjective is not fully reducible to brain behavior -
our intuition insists that they can be at most isomor-
phic. Even more, I claim that it is natural to expect
the two to be parallel in a certain, well-defined manner.
This change of perspective is almost automatic after
one takes into account that we should not treat what
we consider produced by our perceptive apparatus as a
set of images of a “truly” outer world, but allow it to be a
part of a distinct, ontologically closed structure. Under-
stood in this way, the direct content of perception [20],
together with a few abstractions, defines the totality of
what exists from the point of view of an agent possessing
it; for other agents observing the former one, this closed
structure, materialized as brain behavior, looks like an
“artificial”, virtual ontology, influenced by surroundings
of the body. The role of neuroscience here is to ver-
ify that ontology is subjective and that the first-person
perspective is not reducible to brain behavior from the
point of view of its owner. The essential aspect of such
an approach would be finding brain states describing
an agent’s inner, personal ontology. Obviously, in order
to achieve that one needed to be able to follow thought
processes with a good resolution, allowing to recognize
particular notions. Since it appears to be hopelessly dif-
ficult at the moment, I will not elaborate on this point
in the following, concentrating merely on its philosoph-
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ical context. In principle, though, it should all be in the
brain, and it is perhaps only a matter of time for neuro-
science to achieve an appropriate state of development.
Let us be a bit more concrete now. In order to oper-
ate, the mechanism of perception as we know it needs
two ingredients. First, an objective world to be ob-
served; conventionally, it contains all there exists and
is called “reality”. Second, an agent with an apparatus
able to reflect at least some aspects of objects inhabit-
ing the world. From the very beginning, this picture as-
sumes a universal ontological layer, of which the content
of perception is merely an element. What I propose is to
abandon it and pull the very definition of ontology (or
the notion of existence, in fact) into the content, mak-
ing it inapplicable “outside” from a particular agent’s
point of view. This might seem inconsistent at first,
because one seemingly leaves no entities which could be
perceived with such a move. I argue below, however,
that it is the most natural thing to do, for there is not
a single element of a “truly external” ontology in our
minds. Since we know that we have perception only
from its content, not from the point of view of “reality”,
we actually never embed our most direct consciousness
in a more general ontology; we only do it with the ob-
jective brain. As we will see, this is what forces us to
treat the relevant parts of the subjective at most as if
they were produced by perception. The latter might
sound like unnecessary conceptual gymnastics, but is
the only consistent way to conceive observation of an
unreachable world.
Regardless how natural or not this may seem, there
are two important phenomena that encourage one to
believe in such a framework. One is the presence of
so-called qualia, which seem ontologically irreducible
to matter, and thus call for a dedicated kind of on-
tology; the other - a sort of decay of physical quantities
in quantum theory [21], suggesting a lack of a funda-
mental ontological level, which is very much consistent
with limitation of perceptive powers on the one hand,
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tion on the other. Since both of them appear to re-
quire a possibly far-reaching discussion of the notion of
existence, in the following I choose to take into con-
sideration both qualitative, phenomenal consciousness
[22] and quantum physics at the same time. A conse-
quence is that I have to seriously discuss certain aspects
of two extremely controversial and seemingly very re-
mote issues, the mind-body problem and the problem
of quantum-to-classical transition.
Both of these issues are well established in philoso-
phy. The literature devoted to them is abundant and
diverse, to say the least, especially in the case of the
mind-body problem, for it covers a huge timespan and
many sub-branches (see [1]). However, the two areas
are also highly differentiated regarding quality. With a
bit of luck, one may find brilliant observations in each
of them, supported by careful and detailed analysis. At
the same time, the topics belong to those unfortunate
ones to which “vagueness” is almost a synonym. Even
worse, putting them together in a single paper seems to
be the best prescription on how to loose audience - due
to all the unfounded attempts to mix the quantum with
the mental. For this reason, I state it clearly that by ab-
solutely no means do I claim that consciousness causes
collapse or that any particular quantum phenomenon
should have any significance here; moreover, I do not
treat the subjective, qualitative aspect of the mind as
beyond physics in any sense.
The main reason of the problem of mind and body
having such a bad press is that it seems impossible
to even roughly reconcile the existence of a subjective,
qualitative domain with the physical knowledge about
the world, regardless of the state of the latter. Per-
haps because of that it is not difficult to find confusing
denials of the problem being meaningful at all in the
literature. The attitude of treating the traditionally
conceived physical layer as rock-solid (obviously due to
an enormously successful empirical enterprise it is as-
sociated with) easily leads to neglecting factors which,
in the opinion of a given researcher, seem to undermine
its status. A frequent manifestation of this is that the
subjective is considered non-scientific; first, because sci-
ence is defined to be objective, second - for the strange
qualitative material the subjective is furnished with is
persistently irreducible to behavior of what is described
with equations of physics. Ignoring something the ex-
istence of which could not be more obvious in order to,
in fact, save a definition or not to even slightly modify
a cherished methodology seems to be acceptable quite
often.
On the positive side, that there indeed is a subjective
qualitative aspect of our lives which should be taken
into account was also noted in numerous publications.
If I were to choose some standard - and contemporary at
the same time - references to begin with, these would be
[2] and [3], introducing the now famous terms, respec-
tively, “what is it like to be” and the hard problem of
consciousness. Both positions serve as a background in
a short discussion of arguments in favor of irreducibility
of qualia I give below.
There is a plethora of proposed solutions of the mind-
body problem. Regardless if a given author claims there
really is something to be solved or not, these follow
the lines of dualism, materialism (or physicalism), ide-
alism, functionalism, representationalism, epiphenome-
nalism, eliminativism and others. I refer the reader to
[4], [5] and similar publications for a thorough exposi-
tion. Since my reasoning departs from the mainstream
at an early stage, I find covering other approaches to
consciousness out of the scope of this paper, although
I make a short comparison with some of them in due
time.
The problem of quantum-to-classical transition, of-
ten associated with the process of measurement, is in
many respects similar to the previous one. First of all,
many physicists react to it as to a deadly plague. The
reason is well known - debates aiming to solve the prob-
lem introduced a heavy metaphysical baggage, which
is not considered to have improved quantum theory in
any way. Moreover, the transition, whatever one con-
siders it to be, can be safely swept under the rug, for it
does not produce any practical problems for the theory
- the numbers one obtains from calculations are not in-
fluenced by understanding of this phenomenon. Thus,
many people seem to claim there is no problem at all.
As with the presence of subjectivity, however, it is easy
to convince oneself that there indeed is something un-
explained in quantum measurement (see [6]). Suffices
it to say at this point that quantum theory does not
dictate how different experimental outcomes are mate-
rialized, and does not give a clue why, in the first place,
one should expect any need for such a materialization.
In the following I stress that both are natural provided
one recognizes the lack of physical ontology in quantum
theory.
Issues surrounding the quantum-to-classical transi-
tion are, of course, by far younger than the mind-
body problem, nevertheless a significant number of ap-
proaches to them have already been proposed. The
canonical ones include Bohmian mechanics, many-
worlds (and many-minds) interpretation, spontaneous
collapse theories, proposals related to quantum infor-
mation, to decoherence, and others. I refer the reader
to [6] for more details, although - contrary to the case
of the mind-body problem - these will not facilitate un-
derstanding of the following, except maybe decoherence
and its generalizations, like quantum Darwinism [7].
Going back to the mind-body problem for a moment
- although it is mostly disrespected by physicists, there
are at least a few reputable exceptions. To mention
only researchers involved in the birth of quantum the-
ory, they include Schroedinger [8], Wigner [9] and von
Neumann [10]. The latter two are most often associated
with an unconvincing interactionist view, although their
motivation for incorporating the mind into the scientific
picture is very sound. Quite recently, also d’Espagnat
proposed to treat the problem seriously [11].
The core of the approach I adopt can be briefly sum-
marized in the following way. The starting point is the
problem of deciding if the presence of our loosely de-
fined sensory data is enough to infer the existence of
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ally another well-known problem that fits the paper’s
context, which I did not mention explicitly above - the
problem of external world. On the one hand, there are
intuitive reasons to believe that consciousness should
not be considered an image representing in this or that
way an outer reality, but rather a “closed world” with
its own ontology (in-principle possibility of a brain-in-
a-vat and a “sense of existence” contained in conscious-
ness, for instance). On the other, a different intuition
tells us that it should be influenced by “surroundings”,
for it is isomorphic to brain behavior; from a certain
angle there is a clear distinction between the image and
the object. I argue that it is possible to reconcile these
two positions: first, by making ontology private, ex-
actly like it is with qualia, second - by building an ab-
stract, quasi-objective derivative of it, as a substitute of
a “true” reality. As for the latter, I claim its existence
to be undecidable and irrelevant, if one agrees for the
notion of ontology to be defined by consciousness [23].
Naturally, I also show that manipulations around the
notion of existence I make are harmless for scenarios in
which multiple agents with a quasi-objective ontology
each take part.
The solution of the mind-body problem presented be-
low is significantly different from all the canonical ones,
at the same time combining their essential ingredients.
In a sense it is dualistic, since qualia are accepted to be
at most isomorphic to brain behavior, it is also monis-
tic to a degree, for they do not “stand next to” matter.
Perhaps, I come closest to idealism, but I manage to
avoid its central disadvantages, like solipsism (a posi-
tion according to which other subjective minds do not
exist, since they are not directly accessible for an exter-
nal agent), exactly through making the notion of exis-
tence relative, or dependent on the point of view, or -
by disallowing for a common ontological layer for differ-
ent minds [24]. There is also a significant role reserved
for aspects of functionalism, as we will in see in the
discussion of the “Chinese nation” thought experiment.
Even though I am not fond of eliminativism, insisting
that development of neuroscience will contribute sub-
stantially to our understanding of the mind-body inter-
face is well-motivated also here - as I mentioned, finding
brain states interpretable as describing an agent’s inter-
nal ontology will ultimately prove the main idea.
Quantum theory remains untouched by the above
reasoning, with the exception of how it should be under-
stood in case one gives up a global, objective ontology
of a “true” reality - quantum-to-classical transition can
be complete only in an ontology derived from the sub-
jective one.
Last but not least, a word of caution. If I am unlucky,
the paper will turn out to be of value neither to philoso-
phers, nor physicists. This is for a few reasons. First of
all, it is non-technical (and thus “not serious enough” at
first sight). For a philosopher, it is reflected in the fact
that it can be read with no more than a glimpse of mind-
body intuition, for a physicist - that there is not a single
equation to be solved here (although some are given in
due parts of the paper). However, I have a good excuse
for adopting such an approach. On the philosophical
side, I am convinced that what is still lacking in the
mind-body area is an agreed direction in which the re-
search should follow; working out intricate details at
this point will not help much. On the physical side, the
problem of quantum-to-classical transition is of concep-
tual nature, and no internal-to-the-theory mechanism
can solve it (although decoherence, or more recently
quantum Darwinism, plays an important role in appli-
cations of quantum theory to macroscopic systems, it is
not able to explain the collapse of the quantum state).
Secondly, as already mentioned, problems touched here
are rather controversial, to the point that many people
even doubt their existence. Thirdly, it mixes two very
remote issues, which are, moreover, mixed too often,
giving rather unsatisfactory and exotic (in a bad sense)
results.
Let me now give an outline of the paper. I begin by
briefly recalling why existence of qualitative subjectiv-
ity poses a problem for our current physicalist under-
standing of the world. In the main part, I elaborate on
our notion of existence, arguing that it actually does
not point that much at what it is usually assumed to
- i.e. entities inhabiting an objective reality - and that
it should be considered subjective in the same sense
as consciousness. I then show how this is related to
the problem of other minds and the content of mes-
sages we communicate between ourselves. Finally, I dis-
cuss how all this is connected with conceptual problems
surrounding observation and measurement in quantum
theory, as well as its classical limit.
II. WHY QUALITATIVE SUBJECTIVITY
SEEMS TO BE A PROBLEM
Assuming intuitive, objective Newtonian physics, as
it is usually done in consciousness research, the main
problem with subjectivity and qualia is that their role
is at best unclear [3] - they seem physically redun-
dant, since brain behavior apparently explains every-
thing there is to explain about functioning of the mech-
anism of perception. From the scientific point of view,
the only reasonable way to locate anything like a private
impression of greenness in a consistent worldview seems
to prove its physical reducibility to neuronal functions.
This, however, is in no way more feasible than explain-
ing why it exists at all - there is a kind of explanatory
gap [12] here. The problem is that whenever one tries
or is somehow forced to explain qualitative subjectivity
in terms of any established or even imaginable physical
machinery, it sooner or later starts to look inconceivable
- instead of a bridge between the canonical domain of
physical theories and the habitat of qualia, one encoun-
ters a conceptual void.
Let us take a look at some thought experiments
making this statement more evident. My review of
claims against reducibility of phenomenal consciousness
to brain behavior follows a short orthodox list. There
is a well-known argument about logical possibility of
philosophical zombies [3], there is an old one about in-
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story of Mary the super-scientist [15], and the “what is
it like to be” argument [2]. I report them very briefly,
just to define a point of reference - in case the reader
had doubts about their soundness, I strongly encourage
them to go through the literature collected in [3].
A. Philosophical zombies
The reasoning behind zombies is the most direct one
about qualia being apparently redundant in the light of
brain functions. It is conceivable, so the argument goes,
that there exist physically identical copies of us without
any kind of subjective, qualitative side - no sensations,
no feelings etc. If one admits that behavior of neu-
rons is enough to explain the functioning of perception
and other necessary apparatuses connected with it, this
mere observation seems to prove that qualia do not play
any role at all.
B. Inverted spectrum
The spectrum argument is in a sense very much simi-
lar to the story of zombies. Here, however, a conscious-
ness and its associated brain are contrasted with an
identical brain, but consciousness built with the help
of altered qualia, specifically inverted color spectrum.
Since occurrence of such a scenario in the real world
seems conceivable, it is natural to ask: how are qualia
related to physics, if in principle there is a many-to-one
relation between them?
C. Mary the super-scientist
This one often goes under the name of the knowledge
argument. Imagine a lab, organized in such a way that a
scientist occupying it for a lifetime - Mary by convention
- perceives everything monochromatically. At the same
time, she is a world-class specialist regarding human
vision and physics of light. Technically, she knows in
great detail what happens in a human brain when light
of a given wavelength (say red) impinges on a healthy
human eye. Yet, as the reasoning goes, she still does
not know in what way a red quale is different from the
monochromatic ones she is familiar with.
D. “What is it like to be”
This is perhaps the easiest of the arguments from
the list to capture, making it a very powerful one - if
imagining other people’s qualia might seem conceiv-
able, at least to a zeroth approximation, it is almost
certainly impossible in the case of bat’s sonar. This
encourages one to think that there is an indispensable
element of subjectivity in our world, since objective
science cannot reach all of reality.
Each of these arguments seems quite plausible - there
is certainly a fair amount of qualitative subjectivity in
us. On the other hand, however, there is physics with
an apparently different attitude. Again, in the light of
current scientific knowledge it is unnatural to assume
that consciousness is something more than just a phys-
ical structure. What a scientist usually does at this
point is questioning the common sense and assuming
that somehow, in more or less distant future, qualia
will be explained by neuroscience. With such an atti-
tude, however, it is easy to reach a - confusing from an
intuitive point of view - conclusion that qualia are just
an illusion.
The two positions, each one seemingly correct, have
been competing for a long time in the literature. Push-
ing argumentation in any of these directions, however,
is not likely to give any real progress. In such a paradox-
ical situation what might help is a redefinition of some
basic notions quietly assumed to be valid. Two can-
didates emerge very naturally in the present context:
reductionism, because qualia seem irreducible to a ma-
terial basis, and observation, since there would be no
problem of reducibility were there no observed material
entities. In some sense fortunately, exactly the same two
notions cause problems in current physics. Reduction-
ism - because no matter how many elementary quantum
objects one glues together, Newtonian physics (or the
classical limit of the quantum formalism) is not reached
by this procedure alone, observation - because the mys-
terious jump from quantum fuzziness to sharply defined
physical quantities (the famous collapse of the quantum
state) seems to be present only in one’s consciousness.
On a closer look, it turns out that these difficulties lead
to the notion of ontology - or existence - and that this
is the one that should be carefully reconsidered in the
first place. Instead of explaining why, let me point to
the result of the whole reasoning presented in this paper
as a justification for this move.
Before we proceed, a side remark. In order to avoid
an unnecessary misunderstanding, let me stress that I
assume subjectivity to be an empirical fact, and that
the notion of “content of the mind existing for me” is
as obvious as the notion of point in geometry; subjec-
tivity itself is not a problem - only explaining it with
objectivity is.
III. EXISTENCE AND PERCEPTION
“To exist” is a notion of such fundamentality and sim-
plicity that one should not expect it to be adjustable in
any way, nor that such an adjustment was ever neces-
sary. However, I argue - as briefly mentioned - that
we should consider existence to be subjective in a sense,
and not pertaining to an objective reality. Roughly, this
means that each of us has their own ontology (and no
need for a “truly external” one), and that it should be
treated as defined by the subjective mind in the same
way qualia are. It seems a bit like this was leading di-
rectly to typical traps of idealism, but this is not so.
The key is to suitably re-evaluate the notion of percep-
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world, and still retain a construct mimicking an objec-
tive ontology (different from the “mental” one). It all
happens in the mind, as one could say.
The argumentation presented below is restricted to a
single point of view, leaving the problem of other minds
and communication for section IV.
A. How to make an ontology from the content
of a mind?
In philosophy of mind it is relatively simple to hit
upon an idea that the mental is what each of us knows
best, or even that it is the only thing we truly know
(some physicists also share this point of view, see [11]
for instance). As noted many times, perhaps most no-
tably by Descartes [16], one cannot be mislead as re-
gards having a subjective mind. In this context, let
us consider his profound thought experiment, but in
a slightly more modern version - “brain in a vat” - and
perhaps with a bit nonstandard circumstances. Imagine
a human observer immersed in a world, surrounded by
a herd of pigs insisting on being offered their promised
dinner. Anyone who is familiar with these otherwise
very bright and entertaining animals knows that alert-
ness is highly recommended in their vicinity whenever
food comes into consideration. The observer, thus, will
definitely have very sharp content of their conscious-
ness, full of snouts, ears, squealing and mud occasion-
ally flying over. Assume that after some - usually quite
short - time the meal is finished and the observer re-
mains intact, but they have a good reason to live again
through this on-the-edge experience without waiting an-
other several hours. It is not that surprising, for pigs’
passionate attitude and devotion to their interests is
extremely appealing, moreover due to development of
their brains they are very likely to share (unconsciously,
so to say) some cognitive issues with us, making them
thought-provoking partners for human agents in such
thought experiments. Going on, one may accomplish
the task by introducing a disturbance on the way from
the observer’s senses to their consciousness (whichever
regions of the brain it is spread over), provided it is
global and adequately organized, in the sense that the
observer in fact undergoes a kind of simulation of be-
ing in a world. Since this particular observer is mostly
interested in the kind of experiences we are discussing,
one might eliminate all parts of the their body and its
surroundings except the brain (and perhaps immerse it
in a vat), which then would have to be properly stimu-
lated. The conclusion, to the observer’s delight, is that
the they would not be able to tell the difference between
the real scenario and the simulated one from their point
of view. Regarding subjectivity, this shows that the ob-
server’s “inner” domain has to have a significant degree
of independence from surroundings.
Various attitudes have been developed in the litera-
ture regarding this argument, nevertheless I propose to
treat it very seriously. The subjective is, first of all, the
only sphere the existence of which is certain for each of
us, as mentioned. Secondly, it contains what one might
call a feel or impression of existence. This feel comes
at least in two variants. The more basic one is what
accompanies conscious having of subjective experience,
like simple, “flat” sensations and thoughts (their exis-
tence, as it goes, is given). The other one is related to
recognizing entities to some degree objective in charac-
ter in one’s sensory data, whose existence is - to use a
metaphoric language - “revealed” by the window of con-
sciousness, be it that of a pig brought on the edge of
sanity by a delaying meal. Either way, one can say that
the content of the mind just exists. I guess this is what
makes idealists convinced that the real (from our point
of view) ontology lies in the mind.
Subjectivity can be treated in a twofold way here,
depending on whether it is to be viewed from the out-
side, or from the inside. The first approach is objective,
in the sense that it is based on the internal workings
of the brain (and not the qualitative, phenomenal side
of the mind; the first-person perspective is described
then actually from the third-person perspective). In
this setting it is most natural to use the language of the
problem of external world:
• the content of perception either, in some way,
points to a “truly” outer world, so that the ob-
server is aware of them observing it (this is what
I mean by “representationalism” in the following),
• or it is a closed structure in itself, mirroring “true”
reality, but the observer being unaware and un-
able to verify that this is indeed some mirroring,
or how it occurs (i.a. how quantities describing
the outer world are translated into perception’s
internal quantities or virtual objects).
Many philosophers choose the first option. This is
understandable to some extent, for we can distinguish
within the content of our perception “us” and “our sur-
roundings”. On the other hand, it seems very tempting
to adopt the second one - brain-in-a-vat (treated here
specifically as an objective phenomenon, not relating to
the qualitative regime) would not be possible otherwise.
The other view is focused solely on the qualitative
first-person perspective, for it is the natural “inside” of
the mind. Intuition tells us that if one accepts the sec-
ond stance from the previous paragraph, one is forced
to effectively get rid of the notion of objective reality
(the world from the previous picture), even if there are
traces of objectivity in one’s consciousness. For clarity,
I stress that indeed this is the position I adopt in the
following, and that it can be looked upon as the cen-
tral idea of the paper, crucial for the whole reasoning.
Continuing, it has two significant implications. First of
all, any observer-observed relation can occur only in-
side the content of perception, from our point of view.
It means, by the way, that if we wanted to view the
above scenario properly, it could be located only in the
mind, not in any “true” reality. Secondly, a consequence
is that our most basic notion of ontology comes with the
mind, in the same way as qualia do - they both are sub-
jective and can be considered tools of the mind to exactly
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source of our understanding of the term “exists” is di-
rectly in the phenomenon of possessing the content of
subjective mind. It is very important to note here that
the first point - the division between a bodily “I” and
its surroundings, present in the content of perception
- is irrelevant for the second point. In order to avoid
complications it suffices to take a very simplified state
of consciousness, like a uniform visual field.
The claim I make here is a bit at odds with scientific
intuition, for existence is usually something considered
completely independent of us, or “imported” from out-
side the mind. If the above argument is counterintuitive
- recall that if we talk about existence of objective enti-
ties (as in physics, either folk, or sophisticated), we have
to imagine this existence. The process of imagining it
very much resembles imagining having some subjective
entities, unrelated to this physics, like sensations. Thus,
the mind, in a sense, seems to serve as a model here; it
is not difficult to accept that we “learn” the notion of
existence by having the direct content of consciousness.
We will develop this line of thought in the next section.
Specifically, we will argue that if a mind is to produce
the notion of existence, its scope has to stay limited to
its qualitative and abstract content.
Of course, one might object that “possessing qualita-
tive sensations” or “subjective experience” are not very
precise terms. Is this act of possessing a phenomenon
with a structure? How much is there pure “material”
in it, and how many surrounding thoughts? How ex-
actly should one treat qualia? As objects? As prop-
erties? Is there a possibility of having a sensation in
one’s consciousness without being aware of it? I admit,
similar issues make the mind-based ontology a bit fuzzy
at times. These are due in part to introspection being
an imperfect method and should be addressed at some
point. However, if one is to base ontology on the work-
ings of the mind, these ambiguities are not such a big
surprise.
Imagine now we were able to break the just defined
rules and take two points of view - the internal and
the “truly” external one. Immediately, we would notice
that there was no need for the internal and the external
ontology to be the same. Perception, as we generally
understand it, is designed to provide only particular
kind of data to an observer, and if the latter is to pro-
duce their own ontology, it is to be expected that this
ontology will contain elements remote in nature from
the ones living in the “truly” outer world. In such a hy-
brid approach, that is how we could arrive at qualia.
Of course, since each of us can take only their internal
perspective, what we can say at most is that it looks as
if qualitative consciousness were the content of some
perception, itself being immersed in a world out of our
direct reach. Even more, considering the existence (em-
ploying our notion of existence) of such a world as we do
with direct content of our minds seems in fact meaning-
less, or ill-defined; if it made sense, we would not need
subjective ontologies. In this view, i.e. when we are
closed in our minds, qualia have to be postulated.
Obviously, what we have just said does not amount
to a complete picture. What remains to be explained,
most importantly, is how to reconcile ontological supe-
riority of the subjective with our intuition that there
exist things independent of the mind.
B. How to make a quasi-objective ontology
within a mind?
Let me now come back to our observer and take their
perspective (i.e. stand inside their subjective mind).
Assume that my perception is extremely simple in the
beginning, or that:
• I know nothing about my or any other brain;
• my visual field is very simplified, i.e. I have only
“flat”, uniform visual sensations, of simple qualia;
• I have simple thoughts about these sensations,
e.g. I can compare my qualia along a timeline
and I can consider having them (or rather their
“givenness”, since the concept of “I” is very lim-
ited now - I can only imagine having subjective
sensations without thinking that it is me that is
having them);
• no other content of my subjective mind is present.
We make these assumptions in order to erase as much
objectivity as possible, so that the subjective regime can
be conveniently exposed. Note that at this point con-
sciousness does not contain information about senses,
nor even the concept of a body; if I were to use the term
“observer” here, this would obviously be in advance. Let
us now imagine we gradually complicate the above sce-
nario by adding qualitative ingredients, in order to re-
construct the content of consciousness as we know it
from everyday life. We could add auditory and tactile
sensations, for instance, but it is much more enlighten-
ing to enrich the structure of visual data. Now, two sig-
nificant transitions may occur along this way. The first
one - when I become able to recognize spatial (three-
dimensional) objects within my visual field (with some
parts, obviously, hidden), the second one - when I notice
that spatial objects made of visual data can leave my
visual field without being “destroyed” (in other words,
I can follow their history in my imagination when I do
not see them). Both of them extend the primary notion
of existence by pushing it into imagination to a degree.
It is extremely important to understand that at this
point I cannot have the slightest clue that these objects
represent something - they just arise within my mind
from a mixture of “sense data” connected in this or that
way by some thoughts. Going on, among spatial objects
falling in and out of my visual field I notice a body with
a head. If by any means I reach my brain (which might
require some inquisitiveness), it is relatively easy to find
out that it has a peculiar relation with the totality of
my visual field. If something happens to this distin-
guished organ - for instance, because a curious piggy
mistakes my head for a delicious Halloween pumpkin -
the field could in principle become very much distorted.
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entifically most important step in the development of
the structure of consciousness - construction of what is
naturally called “a physical model of reality”. It occurs
when I notice that the brain-surroundings picture, when
copied (more or less faithfully) and located outside the
mind - in a so defined objective regime - explains very
well what happens when my mind is “off” or irrelevant
in a sense (like when I realize that the velocity of light
is not infinite). Effectively, that is how I create the
study object of physics; until we reach section VI it is
assumed that this physics is classical, so that indeed an
ontology can be unambiguously defined. Now, there is
an extremely important relation between this newly in-
troduced layer and the subjective sphere - the former
is intuitively and automatically defined in such a way
that the latter is, broadly speaking, dependent on it. In
a sense, this dependence is causal, but causality acts
here on the level of brain and its surroundings, not on
qualitative subjectivity itself. In other words, we say
that the objective acts on the subjective because envi-
ronment acts on brain and there is a one-to-one mind-
brain isomorphism. To forget about this subtle fact, i.e.
to embed the subjective in an abstract ontology built
on its basis, is to introduce the mind-body problem.
We see that a form dualism has to be left. However,
it is not a typical dualism of entities. It is more like
the mind can be looked upon from two radically dif-
ferent angles - what is a thing in one of the regimes
(the mind), is a behavior (of brain) in the other, none
of these angles being the “proper” one. It is neither a
dualism based on having two different kinds of entities
(Descartes), nor one kind of things with two types of
properties in a single ontology. Rather, we introduce
two radically different ontologies, consisting of different
types of objects, exhibiting different kinds of behavior,
but which are related with the help of the mind-brain
isomorphism. We are in no way able to locate qualita-
tive subjectivity in the “physical” world, for this phys-
ical reality is designed by us not to contain it. The
very reason for introducing it is that we notice some
things “happening” (in a very abstract sense) where our
mind does not reach. Thus, by treating the objective
layer not as a “truly” outer world, but only as an idea of
something akin, serving as an economical means of orga-
nizing and predicting subjective sense data, defined and
living in the subjective regime, we avoid the mind-body
problem. The only obstacle might be a false impres-
sion that something built within a mind cannot play
the role of something on which this mind depends. It
can, if we make a separate ontology out of it - living in
imagination, and different from the one containing raw,
live-experienced sensations.
The justification for what we are doing right now is
quite straightforward - nowhere along the way from sim-
ple to complicated consciousness did we encounter even
a tiny element of a “truly” external ontology. I notice,
of course, my body and its surroundings in my con-
sciousness, but this is not enough to introduce a “truly”
objective, external ontology, in which consciousness is
embedded. Indeed, since what we in this or that sense
call the physical ontology plays the most fundamental
role in organization of our sense data, it is very tempt-
ing to assume it to be universal and include the qual-
itative subjective regime as its subset. It is not possi-
ble, however, for the brain can at most be considered
a representation of the mind in itself. The only thing I
might say is that it looks as if there was an outer reality
which is “observed”, but this reality - whatever it might
be - will never be accessible for the mind. Again, this
does not have to prohibit us from treating “the physical”
more basic than “the mental” - it is only about arrang-
ing things properly in the dualistic collage forced on us.
To put the above in slightly different words, we are not
able to tell the difference between there really being an
outer ontology shaping our consciousness, and its men-
tal model - all ontology we have is either sense data,
or is an idea. Even more, since ontology is so much
based on the mind, whatever patterns I notice in my
consciousness, and whatever abstractions I make, I can
never be sure that the notion of existence my subjective
mind produces in order to use the subjective ontology
and its derivatives actually applies anywhere else.
The general conclusion from the above is that each of
us uses three different ontologies, intricately linked, and
differing, so to say, in the mode of existence they intro-
duce. It appears that the first one can be chosen to be
related to the most direct content of consciousness, or
to be more concrete - the direct live experience of what
we conventionally call sense data, of thoughts etc. As I
mentioned, I would even go as far as proposing that the
prototype of our notion of existence is experiencing the
content of consciousness. The intuition behind it is that
this content simply exists, or is given. (Even if one finds
this questionable or unclear, the consequences of it are
so appealing that one can surely assume this claim to be
a suitable approximation.) Next, there is the “middle”
ontology, which is the one we use most often, on a daily
basis. It consists of entities apparently constructed from
sense data, like spatial objects in our visual fields. Their
significant feature is that they can move in and out from
the mind to a degree (restricting oneself to the visual
field, such objects can be directly seen or not, depend-
ing on circumstances). The last of the three ontologies,
considered fundamental, is what we might call the phys-
ical ontology - “physical”, because it is a collection of
(broadly speaking) objects we describe in physics with
a mathematical formalism (in the following I will also
use the name “quasi-objective”). These objects are ab-
stract in nature, but of course based on the “middle”
ones to some extent (this concerns, for instance, spa-
tial properties). However, they never enter the mind
as the “middle” ones do, which is due to the manner in
which they are introduced - as entities “working” when
the subjective mind is out of the picture. Customarily,
we think about this ontology as of a “truly” outer world.
It is, however, merely a given agent’s objective world.
A terminological comment is in order here. It is ex-
tremely important not to confuse the subjective ontol-
ogy with a part of any objective one. To see how easily
this might happen it is enough to consider an imagined
or retrospective state of the former - the same way I
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do it with a collection of qualia, like a view of such an
object. If I forget to add that the view was experienced
by me, the mind-body problem reoccurs - the qualita-
tive and neuronal sides of the mind are again put in
the same layer. For this reason, I propose to reserve
the word “exists” for entities equipped in an aspect of
objectivity, i.e. for the ones from the “middle” ontology,
as well as for quasi-objective ones (even though these
two ontologies differ substantially). In the subjective
context one replacement for it could be the term “ex-
periencing subjective content”. It is not very fortunate,
however, because for something to be experienced an
experiencing agent is also needed. In the case of the
mind this agent is objective in character, unnecessarily
mixing the two realms. Thus, it is crucial to get rid of
“I”. What I consider more fundamental than “to exist”,
in conclusion, is “to be experienced in a depersonalized
subjective mind”.
Before we proceed, let us consider one more issue,
tightly connected with the subjective sphere. Some au-
thors (see [17] for instance) point that in a fully objec-
tive approach (i.e. one with a “truly” outer world in our
terminology) it is totally unexpected that a single mind
is somehow ontologically distinguished over the rest. In
short, why is it my mind that “just exists”, not some
other one? The answer is immediate in the framework
I propose. If the notion of existence comes with the
mind, and the only ontologies at its disposal are inter-
nal or are derivatives thereof (like the quasi-objective
one), my mind should be expected to be “ontologically
distinguished”, for it is distinguished in its own ontol-
ogy.
IV. MULTIPLE AGENTS
Let us now add a few crucial details to the above
reasoning. They concern, firstly, the problem of other
minds, which should be solved if the proposed solution
of the mind-body problem is to be of any value; secondly
- the way we communicate in a scenario in which a
common, “truly” objective ontology has been wiped out.
A. Other minds
The problem of other minds can be formulated as fol-
lows: since I can observe only brains of other conscious
agents, what can I say about the existence of their sub-
jective, qualitative minds? If we were to formulate an
intuitive answer to this question (without demanding
too much of conceptual precision), this would perhaps
be: each subjective mind exists for its owner, thus it is
natural that I cannot know subjective qualities experi-
enced by other people or animals with brains compli-
cated enough (I bet pigs belong to this group). Now,
the framework I have described in the previous section
allows for this answer to be correct even on the formal
side. Since we eliminate any common, objective ontol-
ogy, only subjective ontologies of different agents are
left. Of course, no single view on all these ontologies
is possible for us - it is always necessary for a certain
singular point of view to be taken (for instance mine).
If I formulate any claim with an ontological context, it
is always from my point of view. The impression that
there is a common layer for all of us arises in me be-
cause I have a quasi-objective ontology at my disposal,
in which there are objects I can consider as other agents
with their perceptions. Any possible problem I may
have with neglecting a global ontology containing every
consciousness arises because I am used to treating the
notion of existence as absolute.
In a sense, I do not need to know the subjective side
of other people’s minds (qualia), since I can potentially
find “it” as these people’s internal ontologies through
investigating the behavior of their brains (which, in the
most general case, belongs to my quasi-objective ontol-
ogy). In this way I can even check if a conversation
I am conducting with another person is indeed about
their ontology, provided I have enough understanding
of their neuronal network. The fact that I do not have
access to their qualia per se as I have to mine is only
a harmless manifestation of the fact that we, as agents,
do not have an ontology which we share between us.
Moreover, exactly for the same reason we can escape
solipsism and not observe other subjective minds di-
rectly at the same time.
As mentioned, notions of existence of other people
(i.e. their subjective ontologies) are necessarily “arti-
ficial” for me, since they are “just” behavior of their
brains. On the other hand, what I do treat quite seri-
ously (i.e. as belonging to my ontology), is their brain
behavior.
B. Communication
Another sphere where a need for a common ontolog-
ical layer arises naturally is communication. Our ev-
eryday concept of it is quite straightforward. There
is a world of things (the “true” reality), together with
communicating agents, sharing certain observations on
these things. This means that any two agents express
their opinions on exactly the same entities, or that they
look on the same world. In the scientific context we link
it with verification. This view is useful in everyday life,
but, obviously, causes serious problems if one wishes to
discuss fully subjective ontologies.
Let us now consider communication in the proposed
framework. First of all, if we wish to introduce “a
world”, we need to choose a subjective point of view,
for only there, as we concluded, any arena can be mean-
ingfully defined (as a given agent’s quasi-objective on-
tology). Assume this agent is me and let us intro-
duce in this world several other observers. All these
agents should be looked upon as being within the cho-
sen quasi-objective ontology; moreover, I am allowed to
treat myself to some degree analogously to the other
ones only because I can look at my own brain from the
outside within my ontology. Can we now say that dif-
ferent observers indeed observe the same set of (quasi-
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than me, talks about elements of their virtual (artificial
for me) ontology, not of objects I have in my, distin-
guished quasi-objective ontology. Of course, objects be-
longing to the surroundings of the observers’ brains in-
fluence their perceptions, but the observers themselves
do not recognize these surroundings as elements of their
ontologies - their ontologies are virtual and contained
in higher-order behavior of their brains, from my point
of view. Nevertheless, communication is still possible
as long as the arena is defined - the only difference be-
tween this and the traditional view is that from my per-
spective we are discussing my quasi-objective ontology,
not a “truly” objective one. Moreover, by examining
other agent’s brain behavior I can potentially see their
own quasi-objective ontologies, i.e. arenas (in classi-
cal physics - identical in terms of structure to mine, if
we are to be able to verify each other’s views). In this
sense, it does not matter which quasi-objective ontology
we choose as the one defining “the world”.
By the way, this illustrates how the notion of obser-
vation changes its original meaning. Since a virtual ob-
ject appearing in an agent’s subjective ontology is not
considered by them as a representation of anything, it
only looks as if an observation was made - by agent
A from the point of view of agent B (i.e. within the
quasi-objective ontology of the latter).
V. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING VIEWS
In order to introduce a general context, I recall the
founding principles of the most grounded approaches to
problems considered above and point relevant areas of
conflict with mine. I avoid diving into details, as well as
commenting on recent developments, for the differences
involved are quite fundamental. For a general introduc-
tion to the discipline see, for instance, [4, 5].
A. Monism
Monism presupposes existence of one type of entities
in reality. Its two most well-known variants are materi-
alism (or physicalism) and idealism. From the point of
view of the mind-body problem, this type is defined by
objects inhabiting the realm of body in the first case,
and the realm of subjective mind in the latter. Mate-
rial entities are those described by the laws of physics,
mental ones - officially hard to tell by what.
Materialism can be further divided into more or less
reductionistic as well as eliminative approaches. The
first class tries to reduce the qualitative to the physical
(qualitative consciousness to brain behavior), the latter
- claims that the phenomenal aspect of one’s life sim-
ply does not exist. It is generally known that the first
group of views tries to be fair with broadly understood
science, nevertheless it does not provide any means of
achieving the reduction (it is relatively easy [3] to con-
vince oneself that the explanatory gap between the two
realms effectively prohibits it). Eliminative materialism
avoids the problem of reduction, but at a rather high
price.
Idealism claims, in this or another way, that the men-
tal is more fundamental than the physical, the latter
being an idea or illusion. As a consequence of treating
the mental as distinguished, it is easy for an idealist to
adopt solipsism. Moreover, it is considered problematic
for idealists to explain existence of objects independent
of one’s mind.
There is also a third category of monistic views - neu-
tral monism. It assumes that the fundamental realm is
neither “physical” nor “mental”, but both of the can be
somehow derived from it.
B. Dualism
Dualist approaches accept that reality is composed of
two types of entities - yes, physical and mental. It is up
to a specific doctrine whether these are treated as sepa-
rate substances (substance dualism) or separate classes
of properties of a single substance (property dualism).
When it comes to possible influence of the mental
on the physical, one distinguishes interactionism (both
regimes affect each other) and epiphenomenalism (the
mental is influenced by the physical, but not the other
way round). Interactionism is known for causing some
discrepancy with physics, particularly with its causal
closedness.
Regarding commonness of the mental - panpsychism
claims that every physical entity possesses its mental
“side”.
Being agnostic relative to the monism-dualism dis-
tinction, one should recall two other approaches: repre-
sentationalism, mentioned at the beginning, and func-
tionalism. The former claims that mental images we
possess indeed represent what is “out there” to some
degree (it is also called “indirect realism”). The latter
view, in turn, proposes that the form and structure of
the mental depends only on functional aspects of its
carrier (for instance, it should not matter if we had
biological or silicon brains - phenomenal consciousness
should stay the same provided these brains behaved in
the same way).
C. Comparison proper
Let me now contrast the framework I propose with
defining aspects of traditional views. First of all, as I
mentioned, I do not allow ontology to be global - one has
to begin with a subjective domain and develop a quasi-
objective ontology on its basis. Then, one might con-
trast the subjective ontology of experienced entities, like
sensations, with the quasi-objective one, which plays the
role of the customary physical (“true”) one. I would call
this both monism and dualism. Monism, because the
foundation for the two ontologies is the content of con-
sciousness (either “live”, or imagined). Dualism, for the
subjective ontology is given and experienced, while the
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quasi-objective one is a heavily abstract construction.
The difference from the traditional monism is that only
the source of the two ontologies is common, from dual-
ism - that the mental and the physical are not present
“along” one another (one is either on the subjective, or
on the quasi-objective side). The quasi-objective affects
the subjective and vice versa, but it is not the kind of
superficial influence known from interactionism. There
is not much to talk about epiphenomenalism here, since
the mental is not a byproduct (epiphenomenon) of the
physical. As for representationalism, we started from
its negation - an agent’s consciousness is considered a
closed world with its own ontologies, so as to allow for
brain-in-a-vat, which we expect to be possible in prin-
ciple. Regarding panpsychism, since each of us treats
their own consciousness as if it were a virtual ontology
developed by perception acting in a world inaccessible
to us, it does not make much sense to look for anything
alike “somewhere else”, for this somewhere else is - as
has just been said - inaccessible to us. Trying to ascribe
such qualities to elements of a chosen quasi-objective
ontology, on the other hand, also seems unfounded, for
qualities are absent by definition of this ontology.
We might, however, say something constructive, if
we make a comparison with idealism and functional-
ism. Concerning the former, it seems worthwhile to de-
scribe once again how it is possible to introduce mind-
independent entities not leaving the mind in a sense.
First of all, I stress that the mental and the physical are
not parts of a single ontology in the presented frame-
work. Thus, making the physical independent of the
mental does not automatically make the former liter-
ally exist outside the qualitative mind (in a reduction-
ist view, for instance, where mind is reducible to brain
behavior, there necessarily is a lot more in the global on-
tology besides - and thus “outside” - the mind). Instead,
we construct the physical (the quasi-objective ontology)
as an abstract sphere, not containing qualities, define
its behavior (through equations of physics), immerse
a brain there (also an abstract structure, obviously)
and postulate the mind-brain isomorphism. Thus, the
quasi-objective surroundings do not “really” exist out-
side the subjective mind, but outside an abstract brain
whose behavior is to some degree functionally isomor-
phic to the subjective.
Regarding solipsism, one is indeed tempted to say
that other subjective minds do not exist. However, since
ontology is not global now, I should say that other sub-
jective minds do not exist for me, while they exist for
their owners. I am fully entitled to claim that other
agents’ ontologies are not equivalent to mine, because
they, from my point of view, are merely behavior of their
brains; thus, these ontologies are less ontological, so to
say. Of course, these other agents say the same about
my subjective ontology.
Since I mentioned solipsism - one cannot forget to
mention philosophical zombies here. Essentially, if zom-
bies were conceivable when ontology was global, it does
not make much sense to consider them here. This is
because for me minds of other agents have the form of
brain behavior - it is meaningless to “turn on and off”
their qualia in my picture. Their qualia exist for them,
and it is completely irrelevant from my point of view
what these qualia are for these agents.
Let us now turn to functionalism, particularly to the
“Chinese nation” argument [18]. Imagine we ran out
of spare neurons, but have a pressing need to simulate
the behavior of a human brain. Since neurons com-
municate, we might choose people to play their roles,
and since they communicate quite well and are quite
abundant at the same time, we pick a numerous group
speaking the same language, say the Chinese. Their to-
tal number is not as large as that of neurons in a typical
human brain, but is at least of the same order. Imagine
now that they perform their roles very meticulously and
succeed at reproducing major functions of the brain, to-
gether with the whole apparatus of perception. Imagine
also that one day someone dares to ask this enormous
system about its subjective sensations (qualia). The
answer can be only one: “I have them.” But for the one
who poses the question the answer seems even more
absurd than in the case of an ordinary brain, for each
constituent of the system is magnified to a macroscopic
size and clearly visible. That is, however, the essence of
the experiment - from the perspective of the one who
asks there is, in a sense, no point in asking this ques-
tion, for it just does not have an answer in terms of
experienced qualia on their side. One cannot expect to
be given someone (or something) else’s qualia in other
terms than behavior of a bunch of neurons (or pseudo-
neurons). The only aspect that might be investigated
in such a situation is whether higher-order behavior of a
structure like the Chinese brain indeed contains some-
thing like the human private ontology, emergent in a
real brain.
VI. PHYSICAL CONTEXT
The above discussion could in principle be considered
self-contained. I encourage the reader, however, not to
stop at this point. The physical part is of great value,
for it provides additional motivation to treat the philo-
sophical one seriously - quantum theory taken at face
value suggests very convincingly that it does not pos-
sess its own ontology. Since it is a fundamental theory in
reductionistic terms, this lack of ontology should propa-
gate to the macroscopic level. This, in turn, shakes the
foundations of any traditionally conceived outer (rela-
tive to the subjective sphere) world in our theories.
Let us pull some relevant points from the philosoph-
ical discussion. First of all, we noticed compelling rea-
sons to treat what we broadly call “existence” as defined
by the subjective mind in the same way as its phenom-
enal elements. It looks as if creating internal ontology
was a fundamental part of the mechanism of percep-
tion, making its content a closed world in itself. If an
observer possesses their own ontology and their percep-
tion is “closed” in this sense, the “truly” outer world is
necessarily an ill-defined notion for them. We concluded
that we can only have a “substitute” of such, built as an
abstraction based on the “given” content of the mind;
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we called it “quasi-objective ontology”.
Now, let us break the rules again for the moment, as
we did in subsection IIIA. One could imagine that the
same kind of relation there is between a brain (specifi-
cally perception) and its surroundings in a given agent’s
quasi-objective ontology occurred also between a “true”
brain and some “true” surroundings, in a “true” reality.
It is conceivable that the mapping between the content
of consciousness and the surroundings had non-perfect
accuracy. This means that in general only some aspects
of the outer ontology would be transferred to the inner
one. The observer, however, would not know that. If we
assume that in such a scenario only some aspects of the
outer ontology are to be translated into, for instance,
features of objects in the inner ontology, the observer
has at their disposal only this limited set of features.
This is an extremely important “possibility”, for it goes
very well with what we see in quantum theory.
It is a well-known fact that physical quantities tend
to become more and more fuzzy on the way from the
macro- to the micro-world - they are the less well-
defined the smaller the scale. If on the macroscopic level
one unambiguously talks about a point-like localization
of a particle at ~x, on the microscopic one this turns into
“smearing” over a spatial region Ω, which corresponds
to an observable given by
ΠΩ =
∫
Ω
d~x|~x〉〈~x| (1)
(I refer the reader to [6] or any textbook on quantum
mechanics for an introduction to its mathematical for-
malism). Within this region, on the one hand, nothing
like a particle’s position is defined, on the other - such a
particle can still be considered point-like in some sense
(take an electron as an example). If one performs a po-
sition measurement on an eigenstate of ΠΩ with another
projector ΠΩ′ (Ω′ ⊂ Ω), a new “position” emerges, or
is produced by the process of measurement [25]. How
this happens is not described by the theory. If such a
state of affairs is here to stay for good (i.e. if this fea-
ture of quantum theory cannot be eliminated by a the-
ory superseding it), this could in principle be treated
as an example of a limited-accuracy-mapping in action.
From our perspective quantum measurement evidently
perturbs ontology (the quasi-objective one), but we are
not able to find a lower-level mechanism for explaining
that. In other words, it is as if we were limited by the
structure or character of our minds in recognizing phys-
ical quantities applicable in our theories (that there is
something like position or velocity to us can be known
to come only from the subjective mind) [26].
Turning to biology for a moment, it is sometimes
mentioned that evolutionism could provide a clue why
qualia are present. Without what has been said above,
this would be hard to believe, for within physics famil-
iar to us biological evolution acts on the level of brain
- which does not make it any easier to grasp how neu-
rons were to produce phenomenal aspects of the mind.
However, things change if one looks at it from the side
of a “truly” outer ontology, something we agreed was
inaccessible to us. If a process akin to evolution really
acted there, it could be considered a force that shaped
our subjective minds to recognize the observables we
recognize.
Last but not least, the same circumstances that could
lead to emergence of properties in the act of (quan-
tum) measurement, could be blamed for the probabilis-
tic nature of quantum theory. If we imagine something
beyond our control that makes our ontology shaky, as
with quantum objects, it is even natural to introduce
stochasticity in its behavior. Of course, we as agents
cannot confirm that - again, from our perspective it
only looks as if this was so.
Let me now elaborate a bit more on the ontology of
microscopic entities described by physics as we use and
understand it.
A. Physical ontology and reductionism
in quantum theory
Conceptually, there is one fundamental difference be-
tween a classical and a quantum particle. It is not in
type of properties or behavior, but in their relation to
broadly understood physical ontology. Classical parti-
cles are fully defined on their own. Quantum ones, on
the other hand, balance on the edge of potentiality -
they need measurement to acquire properties (only to a
limited degree, as we noted); thus, alone they cannot be
used to define an objective ontology. To illustrate the
last point, imagine one is to build a world with their
help. It has been noticed long time ago that regardless
of how many quantum objects one glues together along
the lines of quantum formalism, one always ends up
with a quantum object - nowhere near a classical one.
If one wishes to recover classicality, the only consistent
way is to apply collapse at some point in order for the
big object to gain (almost) definite properties. As a
consequence, quantum theory is defined by its classical
limit, not the other way round, as one might expect
(one may find similar claims for instance in [19]). Var-
ious approaches to this problem have been developed
over the last decades, none fully satisfactory [6]. I do
not want to review them here, or discuss if they are
correct or not. Instead, I try to look at the problem in
the most straightforward way possible - if we substitute
classical objects with quantum ones on the microlevel,
we loose the classical definiteness on the macroscopic
one, and along with it the classical, objective ontology.
Having such a peculiar form of reductionism seems
quite paradoxical (a word that must have appeared at
least once in this context), for quantum theory is known
very well to have arisen in order to explain behavior of
atoms and elementary particles - in a sense, to make
the reductionistic approach more solid than it used to
be before. Thus, if one looks at the situation from the
point of view of a physicist living in late-nineteenth cen-
tury, the time of Newtonian statistical mechanics, this
stance simply failed, for one is not able to recover the
most basic ingredient of the classical theory - ontology.
And yet, to call quantum theory anything else than a
triumph of reductionism would be highly disputable,
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for the numbers coming out of experiments cannot be
explained without dividing a physical system into an
appropriate number of sectors in a Hilbert space.
Thus, it is hard to make sense of the theory if one
insists that quantum objects should exist objectively.
Things change substantially, however, if we take the
subjective approach. Since we are not given access to a
“true” reality, the only objective sphere we might intro-
duce in this context is a quasi-objective ontology built
inside a mind. Now comes the input from the philo-
sophical discussion: because subjectivity is fundamen-
tal, we can modify quasi-objective ontology inherited
from classical physics without any harm - it is not a
foundation of everything that exists, but rather an ab-
stract set of rules formulated with the help of qualitative
experience. Before we do that, however, let us recall
what is understood by quantum measurement problem.
B. The measurement problem
Formally, the issue arises if one wishes to treat mea-
surement as an ordinary interaction, engineered to ex-
tract information about an object. In a wider view, it
exposes the central theme of quantum-to-classical tran-
sition.
Let me give a simple illustration (again, for an in-
troduction to the formalism of quantum theory and its
description of measurement the reader is referred to [6]).
Consider states |si〉 of a quantum system S and states
|aj〉 of a measuring apparatus A, with a “ready” state,
|a0〉. If A can measure S, then there exists a unitary
operator U with the following property:
|si〉|a0〉 U−→ |si〉|ai〉 (2)
(for every i). From the linearity of U we have:(∑
i
αi|si〉
)
|a0〉 U−→
∑
i
αi|si〉|ai〉. (3)
Since we expect measurement to be an interaction like
any other, we should be able to stop at this point. It
is far from clear, however, that one can treat the right-
hand side of (3) ontologically as a result of measurement
- neither the apparatus, nor the object is in a definite
state. Only after performing an appropriate projection,∑
i
αi|si〉|ai〉 Pj−→ |sj〉|aj〉, (4)
can one finish the whole procedure. When exactly to ap-
ply Pj in an experiment and what kind of phenomenon
it corresponds to is not indicated by quantum the-
ory. Moreover, as mentioned, quantum measurement
involves creation rather than uncovering of properties.
The reason is that quantum superposition, from which
measurement picks an option, is not the same as sta-
tistical mixture. Overall, it is as if measurement was
in part pushed from the domain of epistemology to the
ontological one.
How to modify a quasi-objective ontology to account
for that? We can either restrict quantum theory to par-
ticular events, like singular interventions from the quan-
tum regime occurring on the classical level, or apply it
on every scale at once, as a universal description. The
former is essentially the approach of Bohr, with an ar-
bitrary division between the classical and the quantum.
A possible problem here is that, as we agreed, quantum
theory does not allow us to build a macroscopic ontol-
ogy in the bottom-up manner. Fortunately, we do not
actually need that - we can build a top-down one. This
is possible, for the content of consciousness is naturally
associated with macroscopic physics. That is, we start
on “our” level and keep dividing matter more and more.
Of course, at some point we should notice a deviation
from classical physics. What is important, however, is
that the macroscopic level in a (very particular) sense
can be considered to float in the air, and be ontolog-
ically independent of what happens beneath. This al-
lows us to forget the purely reductionistic attitude and
include a one-time quantum intervention (for instance
a measurement of an electron’s position) as a stochas-
tic extra event. If we are good at isolating things from
their surroundings, the size of this intervention looses
its relevance (i.e. during the process of dividing mat-
ter we might encounter a quantum intervention at an
early stage). Thus, the cut (as Heisenberg would say)
between the quantum and the classical can be in a sense
freely shifted over a wide range.
In the second approach we are allowed to be more
precise, so as to find out what happens “on the border”
between a quantum system of interest and its surround-
ings; we have then to approach the latter also from the
quantum side, and include our bodies in the quantum
world for completeness. The only thing to be done here
is to collapse the state of the whole quasi-objective on-
tology (of a single “observer”), focusing on brain sec-
tors in the Hilbert space corresponding to the state of
the associated subjective mind. Temporal resolution of
consciousness is of course different from the one of the
time-evolution operator, but it suffices to find an appro-
priate “brainy” ingredient in the total quantum state,
regardless of how heavily spread in the macroscopically
defined time it is - the exact point at which collapse
happens has to be empirically adjusted with the state
of one’s qualitative mind.
Thus, quantum measurement is complete only when
I check the state of my consciousness. It can happen
only then, for this process is de facto responsible for in-
troducing ontology into the picture; ontology which is
absent in pre-measurement time-development of quan-
tum state. Put differently, the only true ontology I have
is constituted by having of subjective mental content;
only from there can I start building what possesses any
(quasi-)objective aspect. As it happens, due to quan-
tum decoherence (giving rise to quantum theory of large
composite objects) I find most parts of what I build to
contain in practice only classical correlations.
It is now evident where the peculiar relation between
epistemology and ontology in quantum theory comes
from. By doing measurements on the classical level we
13
are able to uncover properties of objects, for a lucid
ontology is defined there. If we build everything in a
Hilbert space, however, it becomes clear that the “phe-
nomenon” of epistemology itself does not work there at
all. Since there is no “us” immersed in a “truly” objective
world according to quantum theory, there is nothing to
uncover. Epistemology is at most approximate for us,
and is applicable only in the classical regime [27].
C. Wigner’s friend
Let us now switch from a single agent to a multiplic-
ity of them, analogously as in sec. IV. In the context
we are discussing consequences of such a move are il-
lustrated in the “Wigner’s friend” thought experiment
[9]. Assume we have two quantum measurement pro-
cesses. The first one includes a measured quantum sys-
tem - a decaying atom is a frequent choice - and an
observer. From the point of view of the latter (their
quasi-objective ontology, if we are to adjust the exper-
iment to our needs) the situation looks like above, i.e.
the process ends up with a definite result after prepara-
tion (left-hand side of eq. (3)) and collapse (right-hand
side of eq. (4)) take place. Imagine now that we treat
this setup, together with the observer, as an isolated
quantum system - close them in a “hermetic” room, for
instance - and include another observer in the picture,
who measures it from the outside. With this we define
the second measurement process. Let us now assume
that the first observer indeed conducts their measure-
ment at some point; thus, from their point of view the
state of the inner system - the atom - is perfectly defi-
nite (from a different angle, the state of the room’s inte-
rior is a trivial, one-element statistical mixture for the
observer staying inside). However, the situation looks
quite different in the second observer’s quasi-objective
ontology - the whole system inside the room is still in
a quantum superposition, which is known not to be
equivalent to an ordinary statistical mixture.
How can it be that two observers have so radically dif-
ferent descriptions of the same situation? It is a good
idea to recall here again the discussion from sec. IV:
since each observer has their own quasi-objective ontol-
ogy, they are never talking about the same collection
of objects. Thus, one always has to choose a single
observer and describe the situation from their point of
view. There is nothing contradictory in the fact that the
internal observer is involved in a superposition from the
point of view of the external one. A problem arises only
if one insists that the room’s interior should be a part of
a global ontology, accessible for and described by both
observers.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We are very much accustomed to thinking that the
content of consciousness is in a direct way a representa-
tion of a surrounding world. This makes us convinced
that existence, as a “phenomenon”, has to be “imported”
from outside consciousness so that we can know what
it is. At the same time, it causes an impression that
ontology described by our physics should only be one.
What - I hope - I have shown in this paper is that these
claims are not that obvious, after all. What is more, if
one gives them up in a clever way, a couple of problems
that seemed to be hopelessly difficult for a long time,
suddenly find an intuitive solution. I do not claim that
there are no details left to be worked out (quite the
contrary - the current proposal is barely adds up due to
vagueness introduced by introspection), or that a neu-
roscientific confirmation is round the corner; I find the
general approach, however, unlikely to change.
Let us summarize the philosophical part. First of
all, one might convincingly argue that subjective ex-
perience provides us with the most fundamental, from
our perspective, type of ontology. Pushed to the limit,
this means that the notion of existence associated with
the latter (depersonalized having, or being given) is in
fact a prototype of any kind of existence as we con-
ceive it, including the objective one. It is then a matter
of some gymnastics to introduce an abstract (although
modeled on the contents of subjective experience) on-
tology playing the role of the traditionally understood
objective reality ; we called it quasi-objective. Its ab-
stractness does not mean that it is made up; rather, if
we introduce objective existence, it has to be an idea.
Neither does it mean that it is trivially contained in-
side the mind, like the contents of the latter. Since it is
abstract, we are free to define it as such that the quali-
tative mind is dependent it - what happens in the mind
depends on what happens in this constructed ontology.
The link between the two (we called it the mind-brain
link) is of peculiar nature; it does not resemble any type
of relation known, for instance, from our physical theo-
ries. Rather, it is one of a kind, for it is a cross-ontology
one. All this shows that a suitably and carefully defined
form of dualism is natural. Concerning the mind-body
problem, we clearly see that trying to reduce qualita-
tive consciousness to parts or behavior of any “physical”
layer is ill-defined from the beginning. Regarding what
we used to treat as objective reality, it only looks as if
there was some “true” physics, inaccessible for us, rad-
ically different from its image we have, and so strange
that it was able to produce an impression of pure exis-
tence - in the form of phenomenal experience - in us.
The lack of a global ontology and promoting sub-
jectivity to a foundation allows for a fresh look at the
problem of other minds, as well as for its easy solution;
it is now easier to accept a claim that something exists
for someone. Another consequence thereof is that we
have to be careful what we understand by observation.
When one has the ability to introduce a body with spa-
tial surroundings (as in a quasi-objective ontology built
within a consciousness), then this notion retains its tra-
ditional meaning. However, contrary to a brain, a pure
subjective mind as a whole cannot be embedded in a
wider ontology from the point of view of its possessor.
As can be intuitively verified, this lack of embedding
is reflected in the fact one actually never claims exis-
tence of one’s consciousness as a whole (this would be
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the “true” physical existence), but concentrates on the
one which points at its content or a theoretical model
living in a derived ontology - if I say “my consciousness
exists” it actually means “a visual content exists” or “a
set of auditory sensations exists”, it is thus a statement
about something inside consciousness. We can go only
as far as having a functional isomorph of consciousness
inside itself, together with some external world, clearly
not the “true” one. Moreover, because everything indi-
cates that such a global, “true” ontology is beyond our
reach - that it actually does not make sense to even
consider it seriously as a notion from a point of view -
we cannot fully treat consciousness as a representation
of an outer world; we would have to reach beyond it in
order to do that, which is impossible by definition, if
we agree that it is consciousness which introduces the
most basic ontology for us.
The above implies that each agent has their own on-
tology, either inaccessible by others (if it is looked upon
as a set of qualia, for instance), or artificial for them (if
it is seen as brain behavior). These ontologies do not
share objects between themselves, but at the same time
are not independent. Their dependence is, of course,
always judged from a subjective point of view.
For quantum theory no formal changes have to be
made - it suffices to solve its issues concerning the no-
tion of objective existence. An ontology defined on the
macroscopic level, like the one constructed inside con-
sciousness, is exactly the missing part of the theory’s
interpretation. The well-defined, top level of the picture
is governed by objective, observer-independent classical
physics, while the remote, quantum one is in princi-
ple allowed to be ontologically deformed, for nothing
is in fact built on top of it - reductionism in terms of
Hilbert space can be defined only relative to the classi-
cal level, which is established in a sense independently
(as an abstraction founded on the subjective). In other
words, we have subspaces for quantum particles be-
cause we recognize quantum particles while being on
the macroscopic level. Atomism itself is, of course, in-
disputable. However, elementary particles are rather
conceptual constructs - quantum reductionism is not
“ontological”. This is not to say that they are “fake”, but
rather that according to quantum theory the best we
can have as a material giving rise to our quasi-objective
ontologies are conceptual constructs.
A better grounding of what has been proposed in this
paper is in the hands of precise introspection and, as I
mentioned at the beginning, neuroscience. The closest
one can get to the subjective from the point of view of
the latter is to recognize it as an agent’s internal ontol-
ogy, visible in brain behavior. On the one hand, it would
be fascinating to see the kind of neural organization this
revealed. On the other, one should bear in mind that
qualia or any other manifestation of subjectivity are to
stay on the other side forever, since subjectivity is a
fundamental aspect of the world as we understand it.
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